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The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) provides funding 
to state DOTs to implement highway-rail grade crossing improvement programs. 
These programs are suspected to develop particular safety improvement actions in 
order to decrease the number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. The current 
work is directed to consider various hazard index/accident prediction methodologies, 
carefully investigate hazard index/accident prediction methods, applied by Tennessee 
Department of Transportation (TDOT), develop a model to allocate available 
monetary resources for upgrades of highway-rail grade crossings in the State of 
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Under title 23, United States Code, Section 130 (hereafter referred to as 
“Section 130”), the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) provides 
funding assistance to state departments of transportation to implement highway-rail 
grade crossing improvement programs.  These programs are dedicated to reducing 
crashes at highway-rail grade crossings through safety infrastructure improvements. 
State departments of transportation (DOT) are required to meet specific reporting 
criteria under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A 
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) to assess the progress and effectiveness of 
implementing highway-rail crossing programs. More specifically under Section 130 
requirements, state departments of transportation should compile and analyze data 
(e.g., crash data, traffic data, physical characteristic, etc.) that will allow informed 
decisions to prioritize highway-rail grade crossing improvements. Programs to 
prioritize improvements, performed at the discretion of the state DOT, are encouraged 
to include evaluation of data compilation and analysis methods to ensure 
comprehensive and efficient programs (Ogden, 2007). 
According to USDOT, prioritization of grade crossings for improvement is 
based on several factors. A significant and integral portion of prioritization programs 
is the identification of hazard or collision potential associated with a crossing. There 
are a variety of formulae developed for ranking rail-highway grade crossing hazard 
indices or collision prediction. Hazard indices rank crossings in relative terms of risk, 
hence the larger the calculated index the more hazardous a crossing; whereas collision 
prediction formulae compute predicted collision frequency at the crossing. In addition 
to hazard index or collision prediction, consideration of additional factors to prioritize 
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crossing improvements include but are not limited to: cost, site inspection, exposure 
(number of persons using a crossing), crossing use by school buses, pedestrians, 
bicyclists, or vehicles carrying hazardous material. 
Efforts to enhance prioritization programs, as previously stated, have led to 
investigation into the efficiency of current methods employed by state DOT’s to index 
hazard or predict collisions (see Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000; Faghri & Demetsky, 
1986; Ogden, 2007). The structure of the these reports was to: a) compile current 
accident prediction methods (referred to as methods or models within this review) 
used by state departments of transportation through literature review and DOT 
surveys, b) evaluate the effectiveness of current hazard/accident prediction formulae 
and comparatively assess the methods using statistical analysis tools, and c) make 
recommendations on accident prediction methods for use by their state DOT based 
upon the findings. Summary of the literature evaluating the effectiveness of currently 
used hazard indices and collision prediction methods are presented in the next section. 
The scope of the current work also includes investigation of accident 
prediction/hazard index models, currently used by different states, applying of those 
models to all at grade public highway-railroad crossings of Tennessee. Besides, all 
considered models were compared with US DOT Accident Prediction Model. 
Using the accident prediction model, employed by TDOT and described 
carefully in the chapter 3, two different approaches will be developed, such as Sorting 
Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical Model (MM), in order to properly allocate 
monetary resources and to achieve the maximum possible increasing of safety at 
highway-grade crossings. Both solution methods were compared in the computational 
results’ section. All necessary conclusions and recommendations along with the scope 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Statistical Analyses of Existing Hazard Indices and Collision Prediction Methods 
In this section literature is summarized that, as previously mentioned, 
compared the performance of current methods used by DOT’s to prioritize grade 
crossings. Three comprehensive studies are discussed in this section. These reports 
presented comprehensive statistical analyses of factors influence on accident 
prediction and method performance as well as evaluated the efficacy of current DOT 
methods prediction capability. Comparative analyses of these reports and conclusions 
which can be drawn are also presented in the next three subsections. 
State of Virginia 
A study performed under the Virginia Highway & Transportation Research 
Council identified current collision prediction and hazard indexing models used 
nationally, and evaluated the representative models’ ability to use available data in 
predicting hazard potential, and recommended methods for future use by the Rail and 
Public Transportation Division to predict accident potential at highway-rail grade 
crossings (Faghri & Demetsky, 1986). The report identified 13 nationally recognized 
models (shown in Table 1), which are currently or have previously been employed 
with success by multiple state DOTs for the prediction of hazard/accident potential at 







Table 1  
Nationally Recognized Hazard Prediction Models 
Coleman-Stewart Oregon 
Peabody-Dimmick North Dakota Rating System 
Mississippi Idaho 
New Hampshire Utah 
Ohio City of Detroit 
Wisconsin DOT (USDOT) 
Costa Contra County 
(California) 
 
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986) 
 
In addition to the review of the current methods, the report presented a survey 
of state departments of transportation current methodology employed to predict 
hazard/accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. Survey respondents from 45 states 
provided the method, and length of time these methods have been employed. Survey 
results, are shown in Figure 1. The survey showed roughly 32% of the states employ 
unique individual formulae, and another 30% use the DOT Formula (also identified as 
USDOT Formula within this report). According to the survey, about 22% used either 
the New Hampshire or modified version and about 8% Peabody-Dimmick Methods or 
a modified version of the original method that is particular to that states’ criteria. The 
method employed by each state is largely dependent on data availability and key 
factors used as predictor variables for the particular method. As part of the survey, the 
study identified the factors considered in reported methods. Table 2 presents the 
survey responses to the factors used in the prediction models by the states surveyed. 
Survey results showed that all 13 models used by 43 of the 45 states consider 
vehicular and train daily volume as a prediction factor within the model’s formulae. In 
addition to vehicular and train volumes were existing crossing protection (i.e., cross 
bucks, flashing lights, gates, etc.) and number of tracks. The collision prediction or 
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hazard index method of choice is inherently dependent upon the availability of data 
and the factors that the prediction formulae require. 
 
 
Figure 1 Utilization of Models to Predict Hazard/Accidents by State in 1986 
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986) 
 
Of the 13 recognized methods (shown in Table 1), currently used or previously 
used with success, five methods were tested and evaluated, as part of the study, to 
determine the methods prediction ability to that of observed accident data. The 
selection was based upon the available documentation of each method’s development, 
testing, verification, and application. The five formulae selected for evaluation 
(shown in Table 3) were categorized into two basic groups (relative and absolute) 
based on each method’s empirical formulae used for calculating hazard at highway-
rail grade crossings (Faghri & Demetsky, 1986). The relative category group 
produced a measure of relative hazard (index of risk of hazard) for a variety of 
crossings which is used to rank crossings. The absolute category produces an 
expected number of accidents over a certain period of time, and the number of 
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prevented accidents that may be observed if improvements are made. The latter 
method produces an expected number of accidents and the reduction of the number of 
accidents at any crossing.  
 
Table 2  
Factors Considered in  the Existing Formulae 
Factor Considered 
Number of Formulae 
Containing the Factor 
(n=13) 
Number of States Using 
the Factor in their 
Formulae (n=45) 
Vehicles per day 13 43 
Trains per day 13 43 
Existing protection 10 37 
Sight distance 7 14 
Train Speed 6 13 
Number of tracks 9 22 
Highway vehicular speed 5 22 
Accident records 5 23 
Condition or type of 
crossing 
3 20 
Condition of approaches 3 6 
Type of train 3 5 
Approach gradient 2 6 
Angle of crossing 2 5 
Pedestrian hazard 2 1 
Distribution of vehicular 
and/or train volumes 
throughout the day 
3 14 
Time Crossing is blocked 1 1 
Darkness 1 1 
Number of traffic lanes 2 15 
School buses and/or carriers 
of hazardous materials 
0 5 












Methods Selected for Evaluation and Testing 
Relative Formulae Absolute Formulae 
New Hampshire DOT 
 Peabody-Dimmick 
 NCHRP No. 50 (Virginia’s Method: the current applied method 
by the conducting organization at that time) 
 Coleman-Stewart 
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986) 
 
The primary statistical analysis tool used by researchers for this study was the 
power factor. A statistical chi-square test was performed for the four absolute 
methods to determine a goodness of fit using 1,536 crossings. Ancillary and 
significance statistical tests were performed to determine if sight distance and school 
bus traffic would affect results when included in hazard/accident prediction methods. 
Results of the chi-square test on the four absolute models revealed that the DOT 
formula produced the closest fit to the actual number of accidents at all crossings. The 
power factor analysis showed that the DOT model outperformed the other four 
absolute models, and suggested that inclusion of the DOT factors for percentiles of 
hazard would significantly increase the DOT formulae performance. The results also 
showed that the effects of sight distance and school bus traffic are not statistically 
significant when considering the influence on hazard/accident prediction formula. The 
report recommends consideration of the severity potential that school buses may 
present over typical crossing accidents be taken into consideration during final site 
evaluations. This report’s findings recommended that use of the DOT hazard 
prediction model be employed in lieu of the NCHRP No. 50 that was in use at the 
time. In addition the report recommended the DOT resource allocation model could 
be used if the Virginia DOT saw the criteria that model uses to prioritize crossings 
applicable. This report, although dated, did provide accurate evaluation and 
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comparison of the current or previously employed formula used to rank crossings, by 
using a large crossing sample size and applicable statistical methods.  
State of Illinois 
A research report prepared by the Illinois Transportation Research Center in 
cooperation with the Illinois DOT evaluated the effectiveness of the Expected 
Accident Frequency (EAF) formula used by the State of Illinois at the time, reviewed 
the hazard index and accident prediction formulae from other states, and made 
recommendations of further use of the EAF or adoption of an alternative approach, 
while compiling information about rail-bicycle and rail-pedestrian stand-alone 
crossings (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The researchers conducted a survey of state 
DOTs methodology and policies for accident prediction models or hazard indexing 
formulae used to prioritize highway-rail grade crossings. The survey elicited 
responses from 31 states. Results of the survey included: a) no formal methodology, 
b) hazard index/accident prediction formula, c) top crossings listed by the US DOT 
rating system, and d) top 20 crossings from FRA list (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). 
The report summarized two sets of variables which are used in hazard index or 
accident prediction formulae, threshold limits used to reduce the number of crossings 
included for further consideration, and other criteria considered by state DOTs in their 







Table 4  
Variables in Exisitng Hazard Index/Accident Prediction Formulae 
Variable in Formulae 
Thresholds used by other 
DOTs 
Other criteria in addition 
to formula 
Daily average train 
movement by type and 
length 
Highest hazard rating 
funding allows 
Adjacent land use and 
development 
Speed of each type of train One crash every ten years Political considerations 
Number of school bus 
passengers 
No firm minimum, but 
ADT > 1,000 vpd 
Near-miss reports from 
railroad 
Average daily train traffic 
(day/night, switch/through) 
Project must be in top 1/3 
of Index 
Heavily used truck/bus 
route 
Driveways and streets 
intersections near crossing 
New Hampshire Index > 
4,000 
Age and condition of 
equipment 
Crash history (Number of 
crashes in n years) 
USDOT predicted 
accidents (PA) > 0.075 
Restricted sight distance 
Approach grade 3 crashes within 5 years  
Number of blind quadrants One crash every nine 
years 
 
Angle of intersection   
Curvature of the roadway   
Surface type   
Heavy truck traffic   
Factor for hazardous 
materials 
  
Average daily traffic   
Average daily school bus 
traffic 
  
Number of tracks   
Number of lanes   
Type of warning device   
Type of area   
Posted speed limit   
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) 
 
The criteria used to prioritize crossings for improvements according to survey 
respondents included: a) higher hazard index/predicted accident, b) benefit/cost 
analysis, c) site review of vehicle types (school bus, mass transit), d) engineering 
judgment and crossing geometry, e) public concern/complaint, f) service condition, 
and g) sight distance (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The report included a literature 
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review identifying existing accident prediction/hazard index formula. The report goes 
further to state that when prediction formulae are used in consideration of cost-
effective allocations of improvement funds, absolute models present the most support 
for resource allocation decisions as opposed to hazard index rankings (Elzohairy & 
Benekohal, 2000). The literature review presented by Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) 
identified 6 accident prediction models and 5 hazard indexing models (shown in table 
5).  
 
Table 5  
Existing Methods Identified in Literature 
Accident Prediction Formulae Hazard Index Formulae 
Peabody-Dimmick Illinois Commerce Commission 
Oregon Highway Commission Mississippi Formula 
NCHRP Report 50 The Oregon Method 
Coleman-Stewart Model New Hampshire Formula 
TSC Model Contra Costa County (California) 
DOT Accident Prediction Formula  
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) 
 
 
The report provides a comprehensive statistical analysis of the variables that 
may contribute to crash occurrence presented in two categories: a) population-based 
rates, and b) traffic-based rates (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000).  The results of the 
statistical analysis showed the relationship between population and crash rates is best 
described by a polynomial function. The general trend of that function was described 
such that crash rates will increase as the population per crossing increases. This 
relationship was determined to be significant when applied to the average number of 
accidents per county, a given number of crossings and population. The population-
based rates did not directly reflect the traffic volume, and the traffic-based rates were 
employed to overcome this deficiency (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The 
correlation between average number of crashes per year and other traffic-based 
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parameters (e.g., average daily traffic, number of total trains, number of tracks, etc.) 
were investigated using linear and nonlinear regression analysis for the following 
models: EAF, USDOT, Connecticut Hazard Index Formula, New Hampshire Index 
used by Michigan, and the California Hazard Index Formula. Figure 2 below shows 
the frequency of different formulae utilization by state in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 2 Utilization of Models to Predict Hazard/Accidents by State in 2000 
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) 
The survey showed around 48% of the states employ unique individual 
formulae, and another 26% use the USDOT Formula. According to the survey, about 
13% used the New Hampshire method and about 3% NCHRP Report 50 method. Ten 
percent of states didn’t provide any information for this survey. 
The report analyzed the efficacy of the EAF formula and other hazard 
index/accident prediction formulae using an inventory of 6,423 crossings throughout 
the State of Illinois. The suggested model for establishing a priority list, developed by 
Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) was the Illinois Hazard Index (IHI). 
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The report presented step-wise regression analyses to determine what 
relationships exist between accident frequency and contributing factors. The 
dependent variable (number of accidents in five years) was compared with the 
following factors to determine their potential as predictors: 
 Average daily traffic (ADT) 
 Number of lanes (NOL) 
 Number of main tracks (NMT) 
 Number of day time trains (NDTT) 
 Number of nighttime trains (NNTT) 
 Number of total trains (NTT) 
 Number of day switch trains (NDST) 
 Number of night switch trains NNST) 
 Maximum timetable speed (MTS) 
 Sight distance (SD) 
 Other multiplicative variables: ADT x NTT, ADT x NDTT, NOL x NMT 
Results of the analysis showed that a regression relation exists between the 
dependent variable and the following predictors: ADT, NNTT, ADT x NTT, ADT x 
NDTT and NOL x NMT. 
The report employed ancillary and significance statistical analysis of the 
effects of other factors on the IHI model including: time of day, type of area, and type 
of warning device. Results showed that these factors (i.e., time of day, area, and 
warning device), when separated into A separate formulae to consider each factor’s 
impact on collision prediction solely, did not outperform models which employed 
these factors in one formula simultaneously (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). 
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The researchers conclude that the EAF formula should be replaced with the 
models developed within this report, the several variations of the IHI, which more 
accurately identified locations that need safety improvements. The recommended IHI 
can potentially be applied to a crossing in any type of area (urban/rural), any with any 
type of warning device. The report recommended further investigation into the use of 
models with separate formulae for factors such as type of area (specifically to 
consider highway functional class) is needed. The report also states that data from 
selected sites should be used to compare reliability in selecting crossings in need of 
improvement (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). 
State of Missouri 
A research report conducted by the University of Missouri-Columbia/Rolla in 
cooperation with the Missouri DOT Research, Development, and Technology 
Division identified models used by different states to prioritize highway-rail grade 
crossing improvements, evaluate and rank the models based on expert panel review, 
and recommend a replacement of the existing Exposure Index (EI) model that was 
currently used by the Missouri DOT (Qureshi et al., 2003). The report evaluated the 
following seven models: USDOT Accident Prediction Formula, California’s Hazard 
Rating Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula, Modified New Hampshire 
Formula, Kansas Design Hazard Rating Formula, Missouri’s Exposure Index 
Formula, and Illinois modified IHI (developed within the previous research report).  
The report developed a modified EI method to include in evaluation and analysis.  
The report included expert panel results for highway-rail grade crossing objectives, 
key variables, and eight criteria to evaluate models (Qureshi et al., 2003). Table 6 lists 
the results of the expert panel. 
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The evaluation of each model was performed by developing a baseline ranking 
of 6 crossings by Missouri DOT staff. The baseline rankings, used as a reference point 
to compare the performance of the models investigated, were developed for the list of 
crossing by the expert panel compiled under the report. The accuracy of the model 
was determined by comparing ranking of crossings to that of the baseline developed 
by the expert panel (Qureshi et al., 2003). Table 7 presents the results of the 
evaluation of the eight aforementioned models. 
 
Table 6  
Expert Panel Results for Model Evaluation 
Objectives Variables Criteria for Evaluation 
Safety (should improve 
safety) 
Annual Daily Traffic Accuracy of the model 
Weighting Factors 
(account for importance in 
calculating number of 
accidents of hazard index) 
Approach Sight Distance 
vs. recommended Sight 
Distance 
Number of difficult 
variables 
 
Data elements available in 
crossing inventories 
databases 
Stopping Sight Distance 




Crash rate = 0 Speed of train Number of key variables 
Accurately predict 
accident frequency 
Number of passenger trains Inclusion of crossing type 
Explainable and definable Speed of highway traffic 
 
Number of unavailable 
data variables 
Priority Total number of trains Number of total variables 
Should suggest crossing 
treatments 
Clearance time for motorist 
to clear crossing 





Source: Qureshi et al. (2003) 
 
Results of the report (shown in table 7) reveal that the EI model which was 
used by Missouri DOT at the time of the study could be replaced with a more accurate 
model. As shown in table 7, the EI model used by Missouri DOT at the time was 
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outperformed in terms of ranking crossings when compared to baseline rankings for 
application to both passive and active controlled grade crossings. The report 
recommended that investigation into the applicability of the Kansas Design Hazard 
rating formula showed potential to replace the existing Missouri DOT method. 
Further research was deemed necessary to determine the application of the Kansas 
Model with larger sample sizes for evaluation. The report identifies concern for the 
consideration of data variables necessary and available resources for additional data 
collection and maintenance in inventory databases to employ the Kansas Model 
(Qureshi et al., 2003). 
 
Table 7  
Summary of Evaluation Results 





1. California’ Hazard Index 
2. IHI 
3. Modified New Hampshire Formula 
4. US DOT Accident Prediction Formula 
5. Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating 
6. Connecticut’s Hazard Index  







2. Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating 
3. Connecticut’s Hazard Index  
4. EI  
5. Modified EI  
6. US DOT Accident Prediction Formula 
7. Modified New Hampshire Formulas 
8. California’ Hazard Index 
Source: Qureshi et al. (2003) 
 
The reports reviewed in the previous section identified nationally recognized 
methods and presented statistical analysis for the comparison of the models presented. 
The recommendations for employment of models for state DOTs, although not 
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reaching the same conclusion, show the rationale for choosing specific methodology 
based upon model accuracy, available data, and model formulation for accident 
prediction/hazard indexing. The reports reviewed provide guidance into adopting a 
new or improve a current method of accident prediction/hazard indexing methods. 
Each of the reports results, although not reaching the same conclusion, clearly define 
the methodology and process for their investigation and recommendations for the 
state DOT based on the pertinent criteria for that particular investigation. For 
example, as shown in many states, sight distance is intrinsic and directly correlative to 
accident rates, although no mathematical evidence supports this relationship. The 
remainder of this report presents a review of the literature related to measuring 
railroad crossing safety and countermeasure effects published in scientific journals.  
Scientific Literature Review 
While there is a significant amount of literature on the broader topic of 
accident prediction models and their consistency, little attention has paid to accident 
prediction and risk measurement in railroad crossings in the literature. Austin and 
Carson (2002) note the shortcomings of the four mentioned methods (Peabody 
Dimmick Formula, New Hampshire Index, NCHRP Hazard Index, USDOT Accident 
Prediction formula) and point out the need for a consistent accident prediction 
method. In particular, it is emphasized that the existing models focus on a restricted 
set of factors effective on railroad crossing accidents and ignore important safety 
factors.  
Austin and Carson (2002) discuss three possible methods that can be used as 
an accident prediction method: multiple linear regression, Poisson regression, and 
Negative Binomial regression. Belle and Farr (1975) use multiple regression to 
examine the factors affecting accident rates in 1,140 railroad crossings in Florida. As 
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noted by Austin and Carson (2002) as well, multiple linear regression is discussed to 
be inappropriate for accident prediction models due to inability of capturing negative 
correlations and heteroscedasticity issues (see, e.g., Joshua & Garber, 1990; Jovanis & 
Chang, 1986; Miaou & Lum, 1993). While Poisson regression may overcome these 
drawbacks of the multiple linear regression, it requires that the probability distribution 
of the number of accidents has equal expectation and variance values. Austin and 
Carson (2002), however, show that the test data gathered from the FRA’s Office of 
Safety highway-rail crossing inventory does not meet this requirement (in particular, 
overdispersion is observed, i.e., the variance of the number of accidents is relatively 
high compared to the expectation of the number of accidents in the data used); thus, 
they utilize the negative binomial regression in their analyses. Their results conclude 
not only how significantly but also to what extent different traffic, roadway, and 
crossing characteristics influence railroad crossing accidents.  
Lee, Park, and Nam (2005) also discuss compatibility of distinct statistical 
tools for accident prediction in railroad crossings. They use data from 100 railroad 
crossings in Korea for the period of September 2001 to April 2002. Analysis of this 
data suggests that the Poisson regression is more compatible than the negative 
binomial regression. Furthermore, they utilize zero-inflated Poisson regression, a 
modification of the Poisson regression to overcome the case when too many zeros are 
observed in the data than a regular Poisson process would predict. Similar to Austin 
and Carson (2002), Lee et al. (2005) use their proposed method to discuss how 
significantly different traffic, roadway, and crossing characteristics affect railroad 
crossing accidents.  
Oh, Washington, and Nam (2006) study railroad crossing accident prediction 
methods for a data set collected from 162 crossings in Korea between years 1998 and 
18 
 
2002. Altering from Austin and Carson (2002) and Lee et al. (2005), they use a 
gamma model for the statistical analysis. Particularly, the reason for using the gamma 
model was due to the presence of underdispersion in the data (i.e., the variance of the 
number of accidents is relatively low compared to the expectation of the number of 
accidents in data collected). The gamma model is then used to discuss the significance 
of the effects of different traffic, roadway, and crossing characteristics on crossing 
accidents.  
While the previously discussed studies focused on estimating the number of 
accidents, Hu, Li, and Lee (2010) and McCollister and Pflaum (2007) studied 
prediction methods for severity of railroad crossing accidents. McCollister and 
Pflaum (2007) proposed a logit model, which is commonly used for estimating 
accident severities (see, e.g., Donnel & Connor, 1996; Kweon & Kockelman, 2003; 
Shankar & Mannering, 1996), to report the factors affecting the injuries and fatalities 
in the accidents along with the accidents using data from FRA’s Office of Safety 
highway-rail crossing inventory. Hu et al. (2010) analyzed a data set of railroad 
crossing accidents in Taiwan from 1995 to 1997 using a generalized logit model. 
Their study revealed the significantly effective factors in severity of railroad crossing 
accidents.  
While the different studies use distinct statistical tools for accident prediction 
in railroad crossings, the goals are two-fold: develop a statistically sound method to 
estimate the accident rate at a given railroad crossing and reveal the factors 
significantly affecting this rate. The estimated rate can be used in resource allocation 
for upgrading railroad crossings, while the factors effecting accident rates can be used 
in developing railroad crossing specific preemptive practices, which are referred to as 
countermeasures. As noted by Washington and Oh (2007), there may be a set of 
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preemptive practices for a specific railroad crossing. In that case, accurately 
predicting the success of countermeasures in reducing the risk, which can be 
considered as the ultimate goal of crossing upgrades, is important for maximization of 
risk reduction through effective allocation of the limited resources.  
Washington and Oh (2007) document 18 countermeasures that are intended to 
increase safety at railroad crossings. These countermeasures are gathered from an 
extensive review of the literature. One may refer to Washington and Oh (2007) for 
definition of these countermeasures and the studies focusing on each of these 
countermeasures individually. They proposed a Bayesian data fusion method to 
estimate the expected performance of each countermeasure. Saccomanno, Young-Jin 
Park, and Fu (2007) develop a similar Bayesian data fusion method to predict 
effectiveness of countermeasures regarding the characteristics of a crossing.  
Yan, Richards, and Su (2010) uses a hierarchical tree-based regression method 
to estimate the number of accidents at a given set of railroad crossings, which were 
upgraded from cross-only bucks to stop signs, to analyze the effectiveness of stop-
signs as a countermeasure. Furthermore, Yan et al. (2010) analyzed the factors 
influencing the effectiveness of stop signs at crossings. Rudin-Brown, Lenné, Edquist, 
and Navarro (2011) focus on the effectiveness of traffic lights and boom-barrier 
controls in reducing railroad crossing accidents. They use a driver simulator on 25 
drivers to demonstrate how traffic lights and boom-barrier controls may reduce 
possible accidents at crossings due to driver behaviors.  
Rudin-Brown et al. (2011) considered different kinds of traffic devices in 
order to improve safety at road-rail level crossings. They investigated perception of 
25 fully-licensed drivers aged between 20 and 50 years, using a driving simulator, for 
two active level crossing traffic control devices (such as flashing lights with boom 
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barriers and standard traffic lights) and passive control devices (stop signs). Results 
showed that the less number of violations were observed at active level crossings than 
those controlled by stop signs. It was indicated, that the majority (72%) of drivers 
reported preferring flashing lights to traffic lights. Nevertheless, the installation of 
traffic lights at real-world level crossings would not be likely to offer safety benefits 
over and above those provided already by flashing lights with boom barriers. It was 
concluded that it was necessary to continue upgrading of rail crossing with active 
traffic control devices to increase the safety.  
Wullems (2011) considered the issue of the low-cost level crossing warning 
devices (LCLCWDs) adoptions at rail crossings. The author stated that the risk along 
the network could be reduced by combination of low-cost and conventional level 
crossing interventions, similar to what was done in the road environment. The paper 
indicated that before application of LCLCWDs it was necessary to conduct a rigorous 
risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses for these devices. The strategy for 
progressing research and development of LCLCWDs and recommendations how the 
Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Rail Innovation can apply it were provided in 
the article as well.  
Wigglesworth (2001) conducted a study of 85 consecutive railway crossing 
deaths, connected with flashing light signals. The results showed that flashing light 
signals gave inadequate stimulus at busy urban crossings, but many drivers behaved 
similarly at both active and passive rural crossings. The author proposed to use 
different kinds of signs for various rail crossings. For metropolitans and urban 
crossings it was suggested to use boom barriers instead of flashing lights. Passive rail 
crossings usually have small traffic volumes and it makes difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of countermeasures. The paper concludes that it was necessary to 
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conduct before and after studies at rail crossings to evaluate the reliability of warning 
signs. Along with low-cost treatments, surrogate measures should be implemented. 
Conclusion 
From the reviewed literature the most commonly used prediction models, in 
practice, are the Peabody Dimmick Formula, New Hampshire Index, NCHRP Hazard 
Index, and USDOT Accident Prediction formula. The Peabody Dimmick Formula 
gives an estimated number of accidents in a five year period considering the average 
annual daily traffic, average daily train traffic, and a predetermined protection 
coefficient. Nevertheless, as noted by Austin and Carson (2002), it lacks validity as 
the data used to develop the formula was sampled from only crossings in rural 
regions, and the predefined protection coefficient cannot capture the recent 
advancements in protection methods at the railroad crossings. Similar to the Peabody 
Dimmick Formula, the New Hampshire Index utilizes the average annual daily traffic, 
average daily train traffic, and a protection factor to determine a hazard index. A large 
value of the hazard index implies a greater risk at the railroad crossing. The New 
Hampshire Index is modified by different states in various ways to include distinct 
roadway characteristics such as number of lanes, sight distance, vertical sight 
distance, crossing characteristics such as surface type, width of the crossing, approach 
angle, and detailed traffic characteristics such as fast and slow train traffic, hazardous 
material traffic, school bus traffic, train speeds, highway speeds, etc. These 
modifications lead to several accident prediction formulae, which result in different 
significance levels as discussed by Faghri and Demetsky (1986).  
Furthermore, these variations of the use of the index created concern in its 
accuracy (Oh et al., 2006). The NCHRP index estimates collision potential using the 
daily traffic, train traffic, and a protection coefficient, which is defined separately for 
22 
 
urban and rural areas. The main flaw of the aforementioned methods is that they 
consider three basic factors to be the drivers of railroad crossing accidents; roadway 
traffic, train traffic, and protection level at the crossing. Developed using the national 
railroad crossing accident data of years 1981 through 1986, the USDOT formula 
includes a variety of crossing characteristics such as maximum speed, highway lanes, 
highway speed, and highway paved factor in accident prediction. These crossing 
characteristics are discussed to be significantly related to crossing accidents based on 
the 1981-1986 data. USDOT formula is discussed to be an improved prediction 
method compared to the previous methods as it account for more explanatory factors 
effecting railroad crossing safety. Nevertheless, as noted by Austin and Carson 
(2002), the USDOT formula has shortcomings in weighting in contribution of 
different safety factors in estimating accident rates as well as inaccuracies in formulae 
updating. A number of alternative to these methods, found in the scientific literature, 
may address some of these issues but are data intensive and their application requires 
significant effort (data, modeling, dissemination) making their use restrictive by state 












3. FRA PROCEDURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION 
This review discusses the USDOT accident prediction model, accident 
severity calculation, resource allocation procedure, and GradeDec software utility. 
The accident prediction model, which is comprised of three formulae, was developed 
to assist individual states in maintaining requirements under Federal-Aid Policy 
Guidelines (FAPG). The accident prediction model is one portion of the US DOT 
resource allocation procedure that is intended to predict, in absolute terms, the 
likelihood of a collision over a period of time at a crossing. Additional equations 
within the US DOT model are used to predict the likelihood of fatalities and injuries. 
In order to provide assistance in grade crossing investment decision making processes 
the FRA developed a highway-rail grade crossing investment analysis tool 
GradeDec.NET (GradeDec). GradeDec gives the possibility to compare rail grade 
crossings improvement alternatives, designed to mitigate highway-rail grade crossing 
collision risk and other components of user costs. The following section of review 
discusses the accident prediction formulae that are included in that model. 
US DOT Highway Rail Grade Crossing Methods 
As a general description, the US DOT accident prediction model combines 
three independent equations to produce an accident prediction value. The three 
equations were developed to include as much information possible in determining the 
accident risk for a highway rail grade crossing. The first equation, also denoted as the 
basic formula, equates an initial hazard ranking for a crossing based upon the 
crossing’s physical and operational characteristics. The second equation uses average 
historical accident rates over a period of time to determine an accident prediction 
value. This procedure uses the assumption that future collisions will be the same as 
previous accident occurrences. The third equation employs a normalizing constant, 
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which is adjusted periodically, such that the procedure adheres to current accident 
trends. The result of these three equations is a final collision prediction that considers 
crossing conditions, historical accident data, and current accident trends to produce a 
reliable accident prediction value, ranking highway rail grade crossing risk, and in 
turn offering a comparative medium for crossing improvements based upon the 
potential for risk reduction. The remainder of this chapter details the three equation 
development, data factors, and processes. 
Accident Prediction 
The basic formula as stated previously produces an initial accident prediction 
per year based upon the physical and operational characteristics of each crossing. The 
technique used to develop the basic equation involved applying multiple non-linear 
regression to crossing inventories and accident data contained in the FRA Railroad 
Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS). The equation can be expressed as a 
series of factors from crossing characteristics that are maintained within the crossing 
inventory. The basic equation is shown below 
 
where: 
a = initial collision prediction, collisions per year at the crossing  
K = formula constant  
EI = factor for exposure index based on product of highway and train traffic  
MT = factor for number of main tracks 
DT = factor for number of through trains per day during daylight  
HP = factor for highway paved (yes or no)  
MS = factor for maximum timetable speed  
HT = factor for highway type  
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HL = factor for number of highway lanes 
The basic equation is developed for three g categories based upon traffic 
control devices present at the crossing: passive, flashing and lights, and automatic 


























Figure 3 Basic Equation Accident Prediction for Crossing Characteristic Factors 
Source:   Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition. 
(2007). Washington, DC: US DOT, FHWA. 
 
The factors listed in Figure 3 can be equated and tabulated based upon known 
crossing characteristics. The tabulated values are used to predict collisions based upon 
particular characteristics for a crossing. The tabulated values for the three categories 
are presented in Appendix A. 





B = second collision prediction, collisions per year at the crossing 
a = initial collision prediction from basic formula, collisions per year at the 
crossing  
N/T = collision history prediction, collisions per year, where N is the number 
of observed collisions in T years at the crossing 
 
The final collisions prediction, B, can be tabulated based upon known crossing 
factors and values for initial prediction, a, and historical collision rates, N/T presented 
in Appendix B. The use of all obtainable historical collision data will provide the 
most accurate prediction results. Collision data collected prior to warning device 
infrastructure improvements should not be included in prediction calculations. 
Historical data older than five years will have minimal improvement on collision 
prediction accuracy. 
Final collision prediction, A, applies normalizing constants to incorporate 
current trends in collisions at rail-highway grade crossings. Originally these 
normalizing constants are developed by periodically setting the sum of the predicted 
accidents, for each category separately, of the top 20% most hazardous crossings 
exactly equal to the number of accidents which occurred in a recent period for the top 
20% of that group. Periodic updates of US DOT normalizing constants since 




Table 8  









According to reporting for the most recently developed constants, the 
normalizing constants were calculated by making the sum of calculated accident for 
calendar years 2004-2008 equal to the sum of the observed accidents that occurred in 
2009 at the same crossings. The process is performed for each of the three categories 
of crossings to account for the trends in collisions in recent history. The current trend 
for collisions, as depicted by the most recent set of normalizing constants, is 
downward; which according to available crash data is representative of conditions. 
The final collision prediction results from the US DOT accident prediction 
formulae can be incorporated into accident severity calculations to consider 
probabilities for fatal and injury accidents or into the resource allocation procedure to 
evaluate improvement alternatives which are described in the following sections. 
Accident Severity 
Additional equations within the U.S. DOT model are used to predict the 
likelihood of fatalities and injuries. The probability of a fatal accident given an 





CF = formula constant = 695 
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed 
TT = factor for through trains per day 
TS = factor for switch trains per day 
UR = factor for urban or rural crossing 
The probability of an injury accident given an accident is: 
 
where: 
P(FA|A) = probability of a fatal accident, given an accident  
CI = formula constant = 4.280 
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed  
TK = factor for number of tracks  
UR = factor for urban or rural crossing 
The equations for calculating values of the factors for the fatal accident 
probability formula and the injury accident probability formula are listed in Figures 4 
and 5. To simplify use of the formulae, the values of the factors have been tabulated 
for typical values of crossing characteristics and are given in Figures 6 and 7 for the 





                 
 
Figure 4 Equations for Crossing Characteristic Factors for U.S. DOT Fatal Accident 
Probability Formula 
Source:   Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition. 






Figure 5 Equations for Crossing Characteristic Factors for U.S. DOT Injury 
Accident Probability Formula 
Source:   Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second 
Edition.(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA. 
 
Resource Allocation Procedure 
Along with various economic analyses procedures, in order to improve safety 
at railroad-highway crossings, the US.DOT developed a resource allocation 
procedure. It assists state railway authorities to find those rail crossings which need to 
be repaired first, and to most effectively separate available funds across multiple 
highway-rail grade crossings. 
The resource allocation procedure is directed to suggest various types of 
crossing traffic control improvements with multiple degrees of risk reduction and cost 
for implementation.  
The procedure provides traffic control improvement alternatives for the 
following: 
 For single track passive crossings two upgrade options exist: 
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flashing lights or gates; 
 For multiple-track passive crossings, the model allows only the 
gate option to be considered in accordance with the Federal-Aid Policy 
Guide;  




Figure 6 Factor Values for U.S. DOT Fatal Accident Probability Formula 
Source:   Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition. 





Figure 7 Factor Values for U.S. DOT Injury Accident Probability Formula 
Source:   Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition. 
(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA. 
 
The resource allocation procedure does not include improvement alternatives, 
such as: illumination, crossing surface improvements, removing of visual 
obstructions, train direction security improvements, etc. The initial data for the 
procedure includes the following contents: the number of predicted collisions; the 
safety effectiveness of flashing lights and automatic gates; cost of improvements; the 
available budget. 
The US DOT, California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and William J. 
Hedley each completed safety effectiveness studies for the equipment used in the 
resource allocation procedure. Various effectiveness factors have been developed to 
evaluate signal improvements applicable for the procedure as shown in Table 9. 
These effectiveness factors represent the overall percentage in rail crossing collision 
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reduction, taking place after application of the proposed improvements. 
 
Table 9  
Effectiveness of Active Crossing Warning Devices 
 
 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration. 
 
As it as mentioned before, the model requires the information about the 
improvement alternatives cost. At this stage, life-cycle costs of the devices (both 
installation and maintenance costs) should be presented. Cost data for the resource 
allocation procedure should be provided for each of the following items: 
 Passive devices to flashing lights; 
 Passive devices to automatic gates; 
 Flashing lights to gates; 
It is necessary to indicate the reasons during the process of cost assignment for 
a particular project, taking into consideration average costs for all projects. To 
estimate the cost effectiveness a special resource allocation algorithm, which would 
be described below, should be used. The amount of funds available for application of 
a particular cross signal projects is the fourth step for the resource allocation 
procedure. The resource allocation procedure hierarchy, shown in Figure 8, 
incorporates all steps which were described in detail above. 
The resource allocation algorithm should be implemented for any proposed 
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signal improvements. The main characteristics of this algorithm are Ej (the 
effectiveness of installing a proposed warning device at a crossing with a lower class 
warning device) and Cj (the corresponding cost of the proposed warning device). As 
shown in Table 10, j = 1 for flashing lights installed at the passive crossing; j = 2 for 
gates installed at the passive crossing; and j = 3 for gates installed at the crossing with 
flashing lights. 
 
Table 10  
Effectiveness/Cost Symbol Matrix 
 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 







Figure 8 Resource Allocation Procedure 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration. 
 
Most of all, the resource allocation procedure evaluates possible 
improvements for both passive and flashing light traffic control devices. An example 
presented by Ogden, 2007: If a single-track passive crossing, i, is considered, it could 
be upgraded with either flashing lights, with an effectiveness of E1, or gates, with an 
effectiveness of E2. The number of predicted collisions at crossing i is Ai. Therefore, 
the reduced accidents per year are AiE1 for the flashing light option and AiE2 for the 
gate option. The corresponding costs for these two improvements are C1 and C2. The 
accident reduction/cost ratios for these improvements are AiE1/ C1 for flashing lights 
and AiE2/C2 for gates. The rate of increase in accident reduction versus costs that 
result from changing an initial decision to install flashing lights with a decision to 
install gates at crossing i is referred to as the incremental accident reduction/cost ratio 
and is equal to: 




If a passive multiple-track crossing, i, is considered, the only improvement 
option allowable would be installation of gates, with an effectiveness of E2, a cost of 
C2, and an accident reduction/cost ratio of AiE2/C2. If crossing i was originally a 
flashing light crossing, the only improvement option available would be installation of 
gates, with an effectiveness of E3, a cost of C3, and an accident reduction/cost ratio of 
AiE3/C3. 
The individual accident reduction/cost ratios associated with these 
improvements are selected by the algorithm to produce the maximum accident 
reduction that can be obtained for a predetermined total cost. This total cost is the sum 
of an integral number of equipment costs (C1, C2, and C3). The total maximum 
accident reduction is the sum of the individual accident reductions of the form AE. 
The resource allocation procedure is directed to identify high-hazard 
crossings. To collect the necessary data and check for accuracy the input data and 
substantiation of each recommendation a field diagnostic team should investigate 
considered crossings. A sample of a worksheet for conducting this procedure is 
presented in Appendix C. This worksheet also includes a method for proper 
evaluating and revising the results, given by the computer model. 
Federal Railroad Administration GradeDec Software 
In order to provide assistance in grade crossing investment decision making 
processes the FRA developed a highway-rail grade crossing investment analysis tool 
GradeDec.NET (GradeDec). This software includes a full set of standard benefit-cost 
metrics for a rail corridor, a region, or an individual grade crossing. GradeDec gives 
the possibility to compare rail grade crossings improvement alternatives, designed to 
mitigate highway-rail grade crossing collision risk and other components of user 
costs, including: highway delay and queuing, air quality, and vehicle operating costs. 
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The online application can is available via the FRA's Website 
(http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/xings/com_roaduser/07010/sec05.htm). 
The software helps states’ railway authorities develop the most effective (cost) 
and beneficial (risk reduction) grade crossing investment strategies. It helps to predict 
the development of the improvement project from the early stages of its application to 
the final steps. Most of all, the model output can be computed by using a certain range 
of the model inputs. It gives the opportunity to see the difference in the sets of project 
and to choose the most applicable of the considered conditions. GradeDec employs a 
corridor approach when analyzing the decrease in collision risk, which was developed 
as part of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21
st
 Century's Next-Generation High-
Speed Rail Program. This approach is one of the most effective ways to reduce the 
overall capital costs involved in constructing facilities for high-speed passenger rail 
service (at speeds between 111 and 125 mph), where grade crossing hazards and 
mitigation measures can be a major cost factor. 
Accident Prediction Models Used by Different States 
Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) currently uses FRA (US 
DOT) accident prediction model, carefully described above, to estimate the number of 
accident at highway-rail at grade crossings within the state. Based on calculated 
number of accidents and resource allocation procedure, the prioritizing of rail 
crossings is conducted. The main aim of TDOT is to achieve the maximum total 
reduction of accidents with respect to available monetary resources. At this point it 
will be useful to make investigation on accident prediction methods, implemented by 
other states, and compare them with US DOT, using the data from TRIMS database 
for all public at grade rail crossings. The following accident prediction models were 
mentioned in the literature review section (previously investigated by Virginia, 
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Illinois and Missouri states): Florida Department of Transportation Accident 
Prediction Model, Missouri’s Exposure Index Formula, Modified New Hampshire 
formula, Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating Formula, California’s Hazard Rating 
Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula, Illinois’s Modified Expected 
Accident Frequency Formula, Peabody-Dimmick Formula, New Hamphire Formula. 
Some approaches cannot be applied for Tennessee rail crossings (Florida Department 
of Transportation Accident Prediction Model, Missouri’s Exposure Index Formula, 
Modified New Hampshire formula, Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating Formula), 
because they consider the effect of site distance. The information about site distance is 
not provided neither by TRIMS or FRA Inventory databases. If this data is collected, 
all accident prediction models could be implemented for all Tennessee highway-rail at 
grade crossings. The rest of discussed accident prediction models will be applied and 
the results will be presented. 
California’s Hazard Rating Formula 
The State of California uses the hazard rating formula, which includes four 
factors: number of vehicles, number of trains, crossing protection type and the crash 
history as input to the model. The difference with US DOT model is that California 
Hazard Rating Formula uses a 10 – year accident history. The formula doesn’t 
estimate the number of accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard 
index, which helps to rank crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The 
highest priority should be assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index. 
The following equation is used to calculate California’s Hazard Index: 
 
where CaHIF - California’s Hazard Index value; 
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V = number of vehicles; 
T = number of trains; 
PF – protection factor (see table 11); 
AH =crash history (the total number of accident in the last 10 years). 
 
Table 11  
Protection Factor Values for California’s Hazard Rating Formula 
Devices PF 
Stop sign or Cross buck 1.0 




Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula 
The State of Connecticut uses the hazard rating formula, which is relatively 
similar to California Hazard Rating Formula. It also incorporates four various factors: 
annual average daily traffic, number of trains per day, crossing protection type and the 
crash history as input to the model. The main difference is that Connecticut considers 
the accident history for the last 5 years. The formula doesn’t estimate the number of 
accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard index, which helps to rank 
crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The highest priority should be 
assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index. The following equation is 




where CoHIF = Connecticut’s Hazard Index value; 
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AADT = annual average daily traffic; 
T = number of trains per day; 
PF – protection factor (see table 12); 
A =crash history (the total number of accident in the last 5 years). 
 
Table 12  
Protection Factor Values for Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula 
Devices PF 
Stop sign or Cross buck 1.25 




Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula 
The literature review section contains description of the study, conducted by 
the State of Illinois, which was directed to evaluate the existing accident prediction 
models (see Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The authors also made a multiple non-
linear regression analysis in order to find those variable (highway and rail crossing 
characteristics), which bring greater contribution to the final value of the accident 
prediction/hazard index. As a result of investigation the following formula has been 
developed (called Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula): 
 
 
where IHI = Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency value; 
A = ln (ADT * NTT); 
ADT = average daily traffic; 
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NTT = number of total trains per day; 
B = MTS = maximum timetable speed, mph; 
C = (NMT + NOOT) = number of the main tracks + the number of the other 
tracks; 
D = NOL = number of highway lanes; 
N = average number of crashes per year; 
PF = protection factor (35.57 – for gates; 68.97 - for flashing lights; 86.39 – 
for passive). 
The formula doesn’t estimate the number of accident at each rail crossing, but 
it calculates the hazard index, which helps to rank crossings by the possibility of 
accident to occur.  
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula 
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula is used by several states of the country. 
Some states conducted additional research on accident prediction, using this model, 
and introduced supplementary variables, such as Train speed, Highway speed, Sight 
distance, Crossing angle,  Crossing width, Type of tracks, Surface type, Population, 
Number of buses, Number of school buses, Number of tracks, Surface condition, 
Nearby intersection, Functional class of highway, Vertical alignment, Horizontal 
alignment, Number of hazardous material trucks,  Number of passengers, Number of 
accidents. As it was mentioned before Modified New Hampshire Formula cannot be 
applied for Tennessee rail crossings because of the lack of information. Nevertheless, 
the scope of this work included implementation of original New Hamphire Hazard 
Index Formula for Tennessee rail crossings. The formula doesn’t estimate the number 
of accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard index, which helps to 
rank crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The highest priority should be 
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assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index. The following equation is 
used for the original New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula: 
NHHI = V * T * PF 
where NHHI = New Hamphire Hazard Index value; 
V = annual average daily traffic; 
T = average train daily traffic; 
PF = protection factor (0.1 – for gates; 0.6 – for flashing lights; 1.0 – for signs 
only). 
Peabody-Dimmick Formula 
Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Formula has been developed in 1941 
as a result of research, conducted for 3,563 rural crossings in 29 states. This formula 
is used to determine the expected number of accidents in five years. The following 
equation describes the Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Model: 






where PDF = the expected number of accidents in 5 years; 
V = annual average daily traffic factor; 
T = average train daily traffic factor; 
P = protection coefficient; 
K = additional parameter. 
The procedure of number of accidents calculations suggests the using of 
various charts and graphs (see Figures 9 – 12). To simplify the process for each curve 
a corresponding trendline has been found (in order to get a mathematical relationship 





Figure 9 Relationship between Highway Traffic and Accident Factor 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration. 
 
Figure 10 Relationship between Warning Device and Accident Factor 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 






Figure 11 Relationship between Railroad Traffic and Accident Factor 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 




Figure 12 Relationship between K-factor and Unbalanced Accident Prediction 
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986). 






Figure 13 Relationship between Highway Traffic and V-Factor 
 
 





Figure 15 Relationship between K-factor and Unbalanced Accident Prediction 
 
Comparison of FRA (US DOT) Accident Prediction Model with Models, Applied 
by Other States 
The scope of the current work included comparison of US DOT accident 
prediction model with California’s Hazard Rating Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard 
Rating Formula, Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula, Peabody-
Dimmick Formula and New Hamphire Formula. The main aim was to find the 
difference between models and figure out which one gives the results, close to US 
DOT. The analysis has been divided in two parts: comparison of approaches for 
passive rail crossing and comparison of approaches for active crossings. Some 
highway-rail at grade crossings were eliminated because of NaN values for accident 
prediction/hazard index (for example, Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident 
Frequency Formula has the variable, which is equal to the natural logarithm of 
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product ADT and NTT; there are many rail crossings in TRIMS database (around 
400), which have either zero ADT or NTT). Thus, removing of NaNs will make the 
analysis and comparison of models more accurate.  
The total number of passive crossings, taken for comparison, comprised 805. 
All rail crossings were sorted based on the accident prediction/hazard index from the 
highest value to the lowest and labeled with rank. The highest priority was assigned to 
the crossing with greater value of accident prediction/hazard index, as recommended 
by numerous studies. After that, the absolute difference between ranks, suggested by 
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula and those, proposed by considered models, 
were calculated in order to see how ranks vary. Average absolute difference in ranks 
with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula has been computed for each accident 
prediction/hazard index model. All calculations are provided in Appendix E. Final 





Figure 16 The Absolute Difference in Ranks with US DOT for Passive Crossings 
 
Note: 
ΔPDF – the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula and  Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Formula; 
ΔNHHI - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula; 
ΔIHI - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula and Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula; 
ΔCoHRF - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula and Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula; 
ΔCaHRF - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident 
Prediction Formula and California’s Hazard Rating Formula; 
From the analysis of Tennessee at grade public passive rail crossings we can 
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conclude, that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the 
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula (162.7 ranks). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively good 
results (the difference comprised only 166.4 ranks). The highest average absolute 
difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula is obtained by 
California’s Hazard Rating Formula (according to Figure 16 - 205.4 ranks).  
Similar procedure has been performed for active crossings. The total number 
of considered crossings, taken for comparison, comprised 1511. All rail crossings 
were sorted based on the accident prediction/hazard index from the highest value to 
the lowest and labeled with rank. The highest priority was assigned to the crossing 
with greater value of accident prediction/hazard index, as recommended by numerous 
studies. After that, the absolute difference between ranks, suggested by US DOT 
Accident Prediction Formula and those, proposed by considered models, were 
calculated in order to see how ranks vary. Average difference in ranks with US DOT 
Accident Prediction Formula has been computed for each accident prediction/hazard 
index model. All calculations and necessary details are provided in Appendix E. Final 




Figure 17 The Absolute Difference in Ranks with US DOT for Active Crossings 
 
From the first analysis of Tennessee at grade public active rail crossings we 
can conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the 
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula (only 290.8 ranks). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively 
good results (the difference comprised only 300.5 ranks). The highest average 
absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula is obtained 
by California’s Hazard Rating Formula (according to Figure 17 - 345.1 ranks). 
The scope of the current work also included supplemental comparison of 
accident prediction/hazard index models to confirm the initial assumption that 
Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula gives the closest results to 
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. All highway-rail crossings (both passive and 
active categories) have been separated for 10 groups (10% of all crossings for each 
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group). The objective was to estimate the percentage of rail crossings, suggested by 
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula and considered accident prediction/hazard 
index models for upgrading, which belongs to the same group. The average absolute 
difference in ranks US DOT Accident Prediction Formula can be lower for a certain 
accident prediction/hazard index model, but set of rail crossings, proposed for safety 
improvement could be significantly different from the set of rail crossings, suggested 
by US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. The results of this analysis are presented at 
the Figure 18 for passive crossings and at the Figure 19 for active crossings. Figures 
20 and 21 show the cumulative percentage of common active and passive crossings. 
 
 






Figure 19 The Percentage of Common Active Rail Crossings with US DOT for Each 
Group 
 
Consider the first group of rail crossings, which presents 10% of the most 
hazardous Tennessee highway-railroad public at grade crossings, proposed by various 
accident prediction/hazard index models for upgrading. The highest percentage of 
common passive crossings has been observed for Connecticut’s Hazard Rating 
Formula (48.8%). Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and 
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed the same results (47.5% of common 
passive crossings). The lowest percentage of common passive crossings has been 
obtained by California’s Hazard Rating Formula (30.0%). As for active rail crossings, 
the highest percentage has been demonstrated again by Connecticut’s Hazard Rating 
Formula (68.7%). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula has 65.3% of common 
active rail crossings for the first group. Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident 
Frequency Formula has 54.7% of common active rail crossings for the first group. 
The lowest percentage of common active crossings has been obtained again by 





Figure 20 The Cumulative Percentage of Common Passive Rail Crossings with US 




Figure 21 The Cumulative Percentage of Common Active Rail Crossings with US 





Thus, from the analysis of groups for percentage of common active and 
passive crossings, we cannot state, that Modified Expected Accident Frequency 
Formula gives the closest results to US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (it has the 
same percentage of the common passive crossings with New Hamphire Hazard Index 
Formula for the first group, but lower percentage of the common active crossings).       
In this case it is necessary to conduct additional test. The first group of 10% of 
the most hazardous highway-rail crossings has been considered. The analysis 
consisted in the following. The average absolute difference of a certain accident 
prediction/hazard index model in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula 
has been estimated only for those rail crossings, which were proposed for safety 
improvement by US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (this test combined the first 
two investigations). Other values of absolute difference were rejected. The results of 
this test are presented at the Figure 22 for passive crossings and at the Figure 23 for 
active crossings. 
From the last test we can state that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident 
Frequency Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed almost the 
same weighted average difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula for passive rail crossings (8.8 percent and 8.7 percent correspondingly), 
which is lower in comparison with other models. But the weighted average difference 
in ranks of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula with US DOT 
Accident Prediction Formula (10.4 percent) is considerably lower for active rail 
















From the first analysis of Tennessee at grade public rail crossings we can 
conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the 
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula (only 162.7 ranks for passive and 290.8 ranks for active crossings). New 
Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively good results (the difference 
comprised only 166.4 ranks for passive and 300.5 ranks for active crossings). The 
highest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction 
Formula is obtained by California’s Hazard Rating Formula. From the second analysis 
we can conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and 
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed the same results (47.5% of common 
passive crossings) for passive crossings. But New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula 
has 65.3% of common active rail crossings for the first group, while Illinois’s 
Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has only 54.7% of common active 
rail crossings for the first group. From the last analysis we can state that Illinois’s 
Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index 
Formula showed almost the same weighted average difference in ranks with US DOT 
Accident Prediction Formula for passive rail crossings (8.8% and 8.7% 
correspondingly), which is lower in comparison with other models. But the weighted 
average difference in ranks of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency 
Formula with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (10.4%) is considerably lower 
for active rail crossings than for New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula (34.1%). 
For the final conclusion, we can state that for both passive and active 
highway-rail at crossings Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula 
gives the closest results to US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. New Hamphire 
Hazard Index Formula showed relatively close results. It was also observed that 
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California’s Hazard Rating Formula gives the greatest variance in ranks with US DOT 
Accident Prediction Formula for passive and active public rail crossings.  
Conclusion 
The review presented herein provides useful information as to how current 
methods are employed to comparatively analyze highway-rail grade crossing projects 
for funding. The current approaches show the factors that are considered nowadays 
for improvement projects, such as risk reduction, project cost, and the relationship 
between risk reduction effectiveness and cost. Existing methods do present 
shortcomings associated to accurate datasets, minimal validation of method results, 
and reduced accuracy creating additional manual and mathematical effort to conclude 
processes. Current approaches provide a platform to advance the accepted state-of-
practice and develop future efforts.  
The methods, with modification to consider the goals of TDOT, could prove to 
be useful for additional highway-rail grade crossing program decision making. Future 
development should address the shortcomings of the current state-of-practice in 
addition to consideration of the outcomes and goals anticipated from the advancement 
of resource allocation or funding decision making methods. Comparison of US DOT 
Accident Prediction Model, currently used by the State of Tennessee, with accident 
prediction/hazard index models, employed by other states, shows that the closest 
results are obtained by Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula. At 
this point it can be recommended to start implementation of Illinois’s Modified 
Expected Accident Frequency Formula for Tennessee rail crossings and to check its 





4.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
As it was mentioned earlier, the main objective of the current study is to 
develop the model, which allocates available monetary resources between highway-
rail grade crossings of the Tennessee State (information is given by TRIMS database) 
and maximizes the total benefits in terms of accident and severity reduction. Two 
different approaches were created, such as Sorting Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical 
Model (MM). 
Sorting Algorithm (SA) 
The first methodology works as follows. First of all, all data, necessary for 
accident prediction calculations, is collected from TRIMS and FRA Accident/Injury 
databases. Based on physical and operational characteristics of each crossing the 
initial accident prediction value is estimated. Using the information about accidents in 
past 5 years from FRA Accident/Injury database the final accident prediction value is 
computed. After the normalized accident prediction value is calculated for each 
crossing as multiplication of the final accident prediction by normalizing constant. In 
the current work the normalizing constants from 2010 were used.  
The objective aims to provide investments for countermeasures 
implementation at those crossings, which will bring the maximum accident reduction. 
Most of all, severity of accidents was considered for each crossing. Severity of 
accident was separated by three categories: 
 Fatality accident; 
 Injury accident; 
 Property damage accident; 
To measure the difference between severity categories, the cost of accident has 
been introduced and applied in calculations (see Table 13). 
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Table 13  
Cost of Accident by Severity Category 
Type of accident Cost of accident, US dollars 
Fatality accident 30,000 
Injury accident 20,000 
Property damage accident 10,000 
 
As it was mentioned before, according to Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing 
Handbook (2007), there are three possible traffic control improvement alternatives in 
the resource allocation procedure: from passive to flashing lights, from passive to 
gates, from flashing lights to gates. Effectiveness of each countermeasure and cost are 
provided below in Table 14. 
 
Table 14  
Characteristics of Different Countermeasure Types 
Type of countermeasure Effectiveness Cost, US dollars 
Passive to flashing lights 0.70 30,000 
Passive to gates 0.83 150,000 
Flashing lights to gates 0.69 150,000 
 
The sorting procedure has been performed based on three benefit options: 
 e/c ratios; 
 a*e/c ratios; 
 s*e/c ratios; 
Computational results of Sorting Algorithm and comparison with another 
solution approach are presented in the next section. 
Mathematical Model (MM) 
The second approach was developed in order to compare it with SA heuristic 
and find out which one gives better results in terms of accident reduction. Sometimes 
heuristics provide solutions, which are considerably different from optimal and are 
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not implemented because of inefficiency. The formulation of model is provided 
below. 
SETS 
 Set of countermeasures 




=1 if countermeasure i is implemented at rail 




=1 if countermeasure i can be potentially 




accident prediction value at rail crossing  j  
 cost of countermeasure i 
 effectiveness of countermeasure i 
 fatal accident prediction value at rail crossing  j 
 injury accident prediction value at rail crossing  j 
 property damage accident prediction value at rail 
crossing  j 
 budget available 
 cost of fatal accident 
 cost of injury accident 























The first objective is directed to maximize the total accident reduction. The 
second objective aims to maximize the total weighted accident reduction by severity 
category. Constraint 3 ensures that the total cost of all implemented countermeasures 
at chosen rail crossings will not exceed the budget available. Constraint 4 states that 
no more than one countermeasure i can be applied at rail crossing j. Constraint 5 
indicates that countermeasure i can be implemented only at potentially considered rail 
crossing j. 
As for parameters, accident prediction value at rail crossing j (a(j)) was taken 
from TRIMS database for each crossing. Cost ( ) and effectiveness ( ) of each 
countermeasure i were taken from Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, 
2007 (see Table 14). It was assumed that total investments for safety improvements at 
highway-rail crossings (C) comprised $2,500,000. Fatal, injury and property damage 
accident prediction values at rail crossing j were estimated using equations, provided 
by GradeDec software. Cost of each type of accident (w1, w2, w3) is presented in Table 
13. 
Auxiliary binary variable  has been introduced to indicate could be a 
particular countermeasure i be implemented at rail crossing j or not. There are specific 
restrictions, established by FRA, for certain countermeasures: 
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1) If the rail crossing is passive and number of trucks is equal to 1, it is 
possible to upgrade crossing to flashing lights and gates; 
2) If the rail crossing is passive and number of trucks is more than 1, only 
gates can be implemented; 
3) To upgrade rail crossing with flashing lights only gates can be considered 
as improvement; 
4) Rail crossings with gates are not subject to upgrading; 
A decision variable  shows each rail crossing and suggested 
countermeasure, which should be applied in order to satisfy objectives 1 and 2. 
Computational results for all at-grade rail crossings from TRIMS database are 

















5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
Both solution approaches, Sorting Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical Model 
(MM), were applied for all at-grade rail public crossings of Tennessee State, provided 
by TRIMS database. The overall number of rail crossings in TRIMS database 
comprises 5716, the total number of at-grade public crossings is 2873. The main 
assumptions, constants and parameters for SA and MM were described in the chapter 
4. 
Sorting Algorithm 
The first approach (SA) has been created using Matlab 7.0. Three different 
sorting procedures were implemented: 
1) Sorting based on e/c ratio; 
2) Sorting based on a*e/c ratio; 
3) Sorting based on s*e/c ratio; 
It was observed that all three sorting procedures suggest to make 
improvements for 83 passive rail crossings and upgrade them to flashing lights with 
the total budget usage of $2,490,000 (among $2,500,000 available). It was observed 
that none of sorting methods offered upgrading of passive rail crossings to gates and 
flashing lights crossings to gates. Table 15 represents the total accident and severity 









Table 15  
Results Provided by Sorting Algorithm 
SA based on e/c SA based on e/c 
TotalCost a*e s*e TotalCost a*(1-e) s*(1-e) 
2490000 2.360948 34153.4 2490000 1.011835 14637.17 
SA based on ae/c SA based on ae/c 
TotalCost a*e s*e TotalCost a*(1-e) s*(1-e) 
2490000 8.854448 128595.5 2490000 3.794764 55112.34 
SA based on se/c SA based on se/c 
TotalCost a*e s*e TotalCost a*(1-e) s*(1-e) 
2490000 8.822772 129100 2490000 3.781188 55328.56 
 
 
It can be concluded that sorting based on e/c ratio is not efficient, because it 
gives considerably lower values of accident reduction and severity reduction as well. 
Sorting based on a*e /c ratio shows considerably higher accident and severity 
reduction than sorting based on e/c ratio, slightly higher accident reduction than 
sorting based on s*e/c ratio, and lower severity reduction than sorting based on s*e/c 
ratio. Most of all, it is necessary to point out that cost of accident by severity was 
taken randomly. It was assumed that one fatality accident is equal to 2 injury 
accidents and 3 property damage accidents (see section 4). To make more accurate 
calculations in terms of severity additional information should be provided by TDOT. 
And after it will be possible to judge which sorting procedure gives the best results. 
Mathematical Model 
Solution of the model (see the formulation in the section 4) has been 
performed using GAMS 23.8.2. SA approach demonstrated inefficiency of e/c ratio 
consideration. Thus, the first objective of MM is directed to maximize the total 
accident reduction with restriction of the budget available. The second objective aims 
to maximize the total weighted accident reduction by severity category.  
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The total budget usage for the first and second objectives comprised 
$2,490,000 (among $2,500,000 available), which is similar to the amount of 
investments, provided by SA. But countermeasures, proposed by MM, were different 
in comparison with SA. Solution of the first objective suggests making improvements 
for 68 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to flashing lights, and 3 flashing 
lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. Solution of the second objective 
suggests making improvements for 73 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to 
flashing lights, and 2 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. 
Similar to Sorting Algorithm, MM doesn’t offer upgrading of passive rail crossings to 
gates. Table 16 represents the total accident and severity reduction for each objective.  
 
Table 16  
Results Provided by Mathematical Model 
MM based on a*e/c MM based on a*e/c 
TotalCost a*e s*e TotalCost a*(1-e) s*(1-e) 
2490000 9.212 132484.0 2490000 3.98 57210.54 
MM based on s*e/c MM based on s*e/c 
TotalCost a*e s*e TotalCost a*(1-e) s*(1-e) 
2490000 9.183 132888.9 2490000 3.959 57264.75 
 
 
It can be concluded that MM based on a*e /c ratio shows slightly higher 
accident reduction than MM based on s*e/c ratio, and lower severity reduction than 
MM based on s*e/c ratio (which is similar to results obtained by SA). In this case it is 
necessary to underline again, that additional data, related to the cost of accident by 
severity, should be provided by TDOT to achieve more accurate results. In general, 
GAMS showed good results and computational time, solving the first objective of the 
model in 0.047 sec and the second objective in 0.093 sec for 2873 rail crossings. 
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Comparison of Methodologies 
As it was mentioned earlier, SA and MM propose different ways of monetary 
resources allocation. SA based on a*e /c ratio shows, that improvements should be 
provided at 83 passive rail crossings to flashing lights. MM based on a*e /c ratio 
suggests to make improvements for 73 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to 
flashing lights, and 2 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. SA 
based on s*e /c ratio shows, that improvements should be provided at 83 passive rail 
crossings to flashing lights (similar to SA based on a*e /c ratio, but the list of 
recommended rail crossings for upgrading is different). MM based on a*e /c ratio 
suggests to make improvements for 68 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to 
flashing lights, and 3 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. In 
order to find which methodology is better corresponding accident reduction and 
weighted accident reduction by severity values should be compared. Accident 
reduction (a*e) and weighted accident reduction (s*e) by severity for SA and MM 
based on different benefit options are presented at Figures 24-27. The number of 
accidents after proposed countermeasures implementation (a*(1-e) and s*(1-e)) is 












Figure 24 Comparison of SA and MM Based on a*e/c Ratio and a*e Value 
 
 





Figure 26 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and a*e Value 
 
 













Figure 30 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and a*(1-e) Value 
 
 
Figure 31 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and s*(1-e) Value 
 
Analyzing Figures 24-31, it can be concluded that Mathematical Model 
outperformed results of Sorting Algorithm based on a*e/c and s*e/ratios for both 
accident reduction and weighted accident reduction by severity. It was also observed 
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that the overall number of accidents was higher for Mathematical Model than for 
Sorting Algorithm after countermeasures implementation. This fact means that 
Mathematical Model proposes more hazardous rail crossings for safety improvement 
and gives the greater accident reduction and weighted accident reduction by severity 
values. It is necessary to point out, the cost of countermeasures is subject to change 
and this fact should be considered before application of the model. 
Sensitivity of the Models 
For a given input data with budget available of $2,500,000 the Mathematical 
Model (MM) outperformed the Sorting Algorithm (SA). But we cannot state in 
general that MM is better than SA before checking both models for different values of 
budget available (sensitivity of models). Changing of constraints values makes a 
significant influence at the model. In the current work budget range from $200,000 up 
to $$4,200,000 was considered. For a particular value of budget a*e, a*(1-e), s*e, 
s*(1-e) were calculated applying MM and SA. The results are presented in Tables 17 - 













Table 17  
Sensitivity of SA Based on a*e/c 
SA based on a*e/c 
TotalCost a*e a*(1-e) s*e s*(1-e) 
180000 1.294988 0.554995 18519.23 7936.811 
390000 2.226838 0.954359 31498.35 13499.29 
570000 2.970597 1.273113 42122.87 18052.66 
780000 3.751651 1.60785 53724.11 23024.62 
1170000 5.075771 2.17533 73260.94 31397.55 
1470000 6.025503 2.582358 87138.94 37345.26 
1770000 6.914407 2.963317 100546.9 43091.53 
2070000 7.751079 3.321891 112850.3 48364.42 
2490000 8.854448 3.794764 128595.5 55112.34 
2790000 9.604151 4.116065 139132.8 59628.33 
3090000 10.32911 4.426761 149727.8 64169.04 
3480000 11.23738 4.816021 162479.2 69633.94 
3780000 11.92326 5.117131 171802.6 73720.8 
4170000 12.77739 5.483186 183877.2 78895.66 
   
Table 18  
Sensitivity of SA Based on s*e/c 
SA based on s*e/c 
TotalCost a*e a*(1-e) s*e s*(1-e) 
180000 1.294988 0.554995 18519.23 7936.811 
390000 2.210237 0.947244 31719.13 13593.91 
570000 2.966126 1.271197 42259.96 18111.41 
780000 3.747696 1.606156 53779.23 23048.24 
1170000 5.055337 2.166573 73553.33 31522.86 
1470000 6.013405 2.577174 87549.52 37521.22 
1770000 6.88244 2.949617 100748.2 43177.8 
2070000 7.736612 3.315691 113111.4 48476.3 
2490000 8.822772 3.781188 129100 55328.56 
2790000 9.562801 4.098343 139983.6 59992.98 
3090000 10.29075 4.41032 150295 64412.13 
3480000 11.19352 4.797221 163188.3 69937.86 
3780000 11.87502 5.089292 172734.1 74028.91 







Table 19  
Sensitivity of MM Based on a*e/c 
MM based on a*e/c 
TotalCost a*e a*(1-e) s*e s*(1-e) 
180000 1.295 0.555 18519.23 7936.811 
390000 2.227 0.954 31498.35 13499.29 
570000 2.894 1.24 41387.39 17737.45 
780000 3.819 1.65 54226.91 23418.12 
1170000 5.192 2.238 74369.68 32050.74 
1470000 6.204 2.682 88347.29 38175.47 
1770000 7.154 3.089 102225.3 44123.19 
2070000 8.043 3.47 115633.3 49869.46 
2490000 9.212 3.98 132484 57210.54 
2790000 10.015 4.332 143906.5 62225.75 
3090000 10.794 4.666 155234.2 67080.47 
3480000 11.764 5.082 169012.1 72985.27 
3780000 12.481 5.389 179277.7 77384.83 
4170000 13.386 5.784 191519.5 82722.45 
 
Table 20  
Sensitivity of MM Based on s*e/c 
MM based on s*e/c 
TotalCost a*e a*(1-e) s*e s*(1-e) 
180000 1.295 0.555 18519.23 7936.811 
390000 2.21 0.947 31719.13 13593.91 
570000 2.954 1.266 42197.54 18084.66 
780000 3.819 1.65 54226.91 23418.12 
1170000 5.191 2.237 74806.03 32237.74 
1470000 6.15 2.649 89238.46 38423.07 
1770000 7.076 3.045 102861.5 44261.51 
2070000 8.011 3.457 115834.6 49955.73 
2490000 9.183 3.959 132888.9 57264.75 
2790000 9.995 4.324 144441.3 62454.95 
3090000 10.762 4.653 155738.7 67296.69 
3480000 11.716 5.061 169756.1 73304.15 
3780000 12.441 5.372 179980.3 77685.96 










Figure 32 Values of a*e Based on a*e/c Sorting 
 
 





Figure 34 Values of s*e Based on a*e/c Sorting 
 
 





Figure 36 Values of a*e Based on s*e/c Sorting 
 
 





Figure 38 Values of s*e Based on s*e/c Sorting 
 
 





From the conducted analysis we can conclude that for all indicators (a*e 
values, which represent the total accident reduction; s*e values, which represent the 
total weighted accident reduction by severity category; a*(1-e) values, which 
represent the total number of accidents left after suggested countermeasures 
implementation; s*(1-e) values, which represent the total number of weighted 
accidents by severity category left after suggested countermeasures implementation) 
MM outperformed SA for the budget available, ranging from $200,000 up to 
$$4,200,000. Thus, MM proposes safety improvements, which result in greater 
reduction of the total number accidents and the total number of weighted accidents by 
severity category as well. The difference between MM and SA for a*e and s*e values 
increase as the budget available enlarges. Most of all, MM suggests implementation 
of countermeasures at more hazardous highway-railway public crossings (which is 
shown by the greater a*(1-e) values and s*(1-e) values for the greater reduction of the 
total number accidents and the total number of weighted accidents by severity 
category) in comparison with SA. The difference between MM and SA for a*(1-e) 
and s*(1-e) values increase as the budget available enlarges. 
So, the Mathematical Model (MM) outperforms the Sorting Algorithm (SA) 
based on sensitivity analysis and it is recommended for the further usage in order to 
allocate the available monetary resources between highway-railroad public at grade 
Tennessee crossings to apply the Mathematical Model (MM). 
The Logit Model for Accident Prediction by Severity Category 
The main aim of the current work is the development of highway-railroad at 
grade crossings prioritizing model. The model should identify those rail crossings 
which will result in the maximum benefit in terms of accident reduction/weighted 
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accident reduction by severity category after certain countermeasures implementation 
for the given budget. Severity of accidents was separated by three categories: 
 Fatality accident; 
 Injury accident; 
 Property damage accident; 
To estimate the weighted accident prediction by severity category, it is 
necessary to calculate the number of predicted fatality, injury and property damage 
accidents. Equations, proposed by GradeDec software, were used for this purpose. In 
the section of literature review the paper, written by Hu et al. (2009), was mentioned. 
The authors use the Logit model to predict the number of accidents by severity 
category. In this case it will be useful to apply the Logit model and compare results 
with output of the GradeDec model. 
Hu et al. (2009) define a generalized logit as 
 
where x – set of highway-railroad crossing characteristics; 
j – set of severity categories; 
πj – the probability of accident j to happen; 
π0 – the probability of a “pivot“ accident to happen; 
Set of highway-railroad crossing characteristics included the same parameters, 
which are used by GradeDec model: maximum time table trains peed, miles per hour; 
through trains per day; switch trains per day; binary variable, if crossing is urban, 
Urban = 1,else Urban = 0; number of the main rail road tracks. As it was mentioned 




Hu et al. (2009) propose to form a logit as a linear predictor 
 
where α and β – coefficients of the multinomial logistic regression. 
To find the relationship between number of each severity category and 
variables, describing highway-railroad crossing characteristics, the multinomial 
logistic regression analysis has been conducted using Matlab 7.0. The accident history 
for the last 10 years data has been uploaded from FRA accident/injury database to 
compute the actual number of fatality, injury and property damage accidents for each 
public at grade crossing of TN State. The results are presented in the Table 21. The 
relationship between predictors and response variables turned out to be: 
Logit (PDO) = 29.95249 - 0.12046*X1 - 0.03353*X2 - 0.39736*X3 - 
19.1145*X4 - 0.71761*X5; 
Logit (Injury) = 27.43512 - 0.10406*X1 - 0.20236*X2 - 0.47232*X3 - 
20.4985*X4 + 1.606862*X5, 
where X1 – maximum time table train speed, miles per hour;  
X2 – through trains per day;  
X3 – switch trains per day;  
X4 - binary variable, if crossing is urban, Urban=1, else Urban=0;  








Table 21  
The FRA 2010 Accident Data by Severity Category 
Actual number of accidents (FRA 2010) 
№ cross.\Acc. Type Fatalities Injuries PDO 
1 2 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 
5 1 0 0 
6 1 0 0 
7 1 0 0 
8 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
11 0 1 0 
12 1 0 0 
13 1 0 0 
14 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 
16 1 0 0 
17 1 0 0 
18 1 0 0 
19 1 0 0 
20 0 1 0 
21 1 0 0 
22 0 0 1 
23 1 0 0 
24 0 1 0 
25 1 0 0 
26 1 0 0 
27 0 1 0 
28 1 0 0 
29 1 0 0 
30 1 0 0 
31 1 0 0 
32 1 0 0 





Fatality accident has been taken as a “pivot” accident. The probability of the 
accident by severity category for the given crossing can be calculated as (see Hu et al. 
2009): 
 
This formula has been applied for each highway-railroad at grade crossing to 
find the probability of fatality, injury and property damage accidents to happen. To 
find the actual number of accidents by severity, proposed by the Logit model, the 
accident prediction values for each crossing (given by TRIMS database) were 
multiplied by corresponding probability of the considered category. The results of 
computations are presented in Table 22. 
Comparison of the Logit and GradeDec Models 
Table 22 and Figure 40 show the predicted number of accidents by severity 
category, using the Logit model and the GradeDec model for those at grade public 
highway-railroad crossings, at which accidents have been observed in 2010 according 





















Table 22  
Comparison of the Logit and GradeDec Models 
Results of Logit Model Results of GradeDec 
PDO Injuries Fatalities Fatalities Injuries PDO 
0,180243 0,015249 0,000334 0,007771 0,063427 0,124629 
0,051122 0,006792 0,005512 0,006168 0,020492 0,036766 
0,116204 0,030117 0,004032 0,013628 0,048815 0,087912 
0,055405 0,007011 0,010470 0,005158 0,021754 0,045974 
0,066708 0,008222 0,010701 0,008065 0,027192 0,050374 
0,065680 0,006775 0,000428 0,005170 0,024078 0,043635 
0,060986 0,012779 0,000018 0,001044 0,016525 0,056213 
0,049133 0,000746 0,000035 0,000657 0,010573 0,038684 
0,051482 0,000782 0,000037 0,000688 0,011079 0,040534 
0,020873 0,004374 0,000006 0,000357 0,005656 0,019239 
0,153394 0,117042 0,000000 0,014428 0,094376 0,161632 
0,086199 0,054250 0,000000 0,011854 0,054018 0,074577 
0,101667 0,001920 0,011017 0,012571 0,039385 0,062647 
0,154151 0,031259 0,000036 0,002107 0,039531 0,143810 
0,044302 0,010785 0,000006 0,000857 0,013244 0,040992 
0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 
0,173383 0,014185 0,000000 0,003771 0,054145 0,129653 
0,338566 0,035591 0,004721 0,024344 0,118153 0,236382 
0,001516 0,000178 0,000000 0,000126 0,000654 0,000914 
0,051464 0,009957 0,000078 0,001774 0,016131 0,043595 
0,260047 0,027337 0,003626 0,018698 0,090751 0,181561 
0,128149 0,012292 0,011640 0,013348 0,048510 0,090222 
0,025253 0,003944 0,000969 0,002838 0,009991 0,017337 
0,042689 0,008162 0,000083 0,001932 0,014376 0,034625 
0,114525 0,001946 0,000008 0,001991 0,029995 0,084493 
0,152498 0,025575 0,001399 0,006128 0,047157 0,126187 
0,129523 0,006735 0,011477 0,015787 0,050118 0,081831 
0,005649 0,000135 0,000000 0,000090 0,001390 0,004303 
0,223782 0,002320 0,000427 0,001445 0,039409 0,185676 
0,055277 0,006359 0,000395 0,000785 0,012749 0,048496 
0,114425 0,016385 0,008292 0,014283 0,046243 0,078576 
0,085565 0,017174 0,005798 0,010928 0,035715 0,061894 
0,162573 0,014815 0,013638 0,012947 0,058003 0,120078 




It can be concluded that the Logit model gives lower number of fatalities, 
approximately the same number of injuries (slightly lower) and higher number of 
property damage accidents in comparison with the GradeDec model. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients of determination (which represent the accuracy of model and how well it 
fits), were relatively low for the Logit model: for PDO accidents – 0.274, for injury 
accidents – 0.109, for fatalities – 0.026.  In order to make a correct evaluation of each 
model output additional research, connected with site investigation at each highway-
railroad at grade crossing, should be conducted. After that it is possible to state which 
model is better and needs to be applied. In the current work the GradeDec model 
(which is used commonly used within the country) has been implemented for 



























According to Section 130 the United States Department of Transportation 
(USDOT) provides funding assistance to state departments of transportation to 
implement highway-rail grade crossing improvement programs. These programs are 
suspect to develop particular safety improvement actions in order to decrease the 
number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. The current work was dedicated 
to allocate available monetary resources between highway-rail grade crossings of the 
Tennessee State (information is given by TRIMS database) and maximize the total 
benefits in terms of accident and severity reduction. The scope of work included the 
literature review with description of hazard index/accident prediction methodologies, 
widely used by various DOTs; careful investigation of the accident prediction method, 
applied by TDOT; development of the model to satisfy the established goals and 
computational results, demonstrated benefits and negative sites of both models. 
Comparison of US DOT Accident Prediction Model, currently used by the 
State of Tennessee, with accident prediction/hazard index models, employed by other 
states, shows that the closest results are obtained by Illinois’s Modified Expected 
Accident Frequency Formula. At this point it can be recommended to start 
implementation of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula for 
Tennessee rail crossings and to check its accuracy over a certain time period (several 
years).  
The scope of the conducted work also included application of the Logit model 
for accident prediction by severity category. It was observed that the Logit model 
gave lower number of fatalities, approximately the same number of injuries (slightly 
lower) and higher number of property damage accidents in comparison with the 
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GradeDec model. Additional research should be provided at that point to evaluate 
which model is better for highway-railroad public crossings of Tennessee State. 
It was concluded that Mathematical Model was more efficient than Sorting 
Algorithm, because MM provided greater accident reduction and weighted accident 
reduction by severity. In comparison with SA, MM proposed safety improvements not 
only from passive rail crossings to flashing lights, but also upgrading of flashing 
lights rail crossings to gates. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify the main aim of 
investments: to reduce the overall number of accidents or to decrease the number of 
fatalities, injuries and property damage accidents, taking into consideration that the 
cost of fatality is greater than the cost of injury and the cost of injury is greater than 
the cost of property damage accident. For the first case it is better to use MM with the 
first objective. For the second case it is better to use MM with the second objective. 
GAMS showed a good computational time for 2873 rail crossings. 
Besides, there are several issues, which should be considered in the future 
research. The cost of accident was set based on assumption, that one fatality is equal 
to 2 injuries of 3 property damage accidents. The nature of relationship between those 
severity categories could be more complex. This question should be addressed by 
TDOT before application of the proposed model. Most of all, cost of countermeasures 
was taken from Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook (2007), which are 
subject to change to higher values. The resource allocation procedure can be extended 
and new countermeasures may be introduced. But in this case additional information 
should be provided by TDOT. It is recommended to check the sensitivity of the 
model, using larger size of input data (e.g., consider public at-grade highway-rail 
crossings of other states). 
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For the final conclusion, Mathematical Model, developed in the current work, 
can be used as a powerful tool to solve a relatively complex problem of monetary 
resources allocation between highway-rail crossings to maximize the safety and to 
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